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Abstract: Bruno de Finetti was one of the most convinced advocates of
finitely additive probabilities. The present work describes the intellectual pro-
cess that led him to support that stance and provides a detailed account both
of the first paper by de Finetti on the subject and of the ensuing correspon-
dence with Maurice Fre´chet. Moreover, the analysis is supplemented by a useful
picture of de Finetti’s interactions with the international scientific community
at that time, when he elaborated his subjectivistic conception of probability.
1. Introduction
Finitely additive probabilities are indissolubly linked to the name of Bruno de Finetti
(1906-1985). Indeed, he has been one of the most convinced advocates of finite ad-
ditivity, since he has started working on the mathematical formulation that he
proposed, in 1930, for his subjectivistic conception of probability. Most of the re-
cent contributions to this topic in the literature rely on (English translations of) late
works by de Finetti, instead of considering his early papers containing a wealth of
fresh and original ideas. A typical feature of de Finetti’s late works is that they gen-
erally aim at providing critical syntheses of his original way of thinking about crucial
problems concerning: Probability, Induction, Statistics, Insurance, Economics, Pol-
itics, to say nothing of the philosophical debate at large. Hence, in these writings he
makes limited use of mathematical formalism, omits precise references of an histor-
ical nature, whilst he often jumps at the chance of both controversial amusing hints
and sharp provocative cues. Nevertheless, late works share with the early ones the
feature of being faultless from the point of view of logical and conceptual accuracy.
It is not, then, surprising that, as far as finite additivity is concerned, essays on
de Finetti’s work often reduce the topic either to an intellectual activity or, at best,
to an issue of a mere mathematical taste. In the latter case, special attention is
given to connections and consequences of a formal nature. So, they generally fail to
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shed some light on the intellectual efforts that led him to share that seemingly sin-
gular position. In fact, the authentic motivations supporting de Finetti’s stance in
probability can be found in his early works. These, among other things, are tersely
written and contain accurate formulations of theorems thus allowing one a more
sound understanding of his innovations.
The main purpose of the present work is to discuss the first paper that, at the
best of this author’s knowledge, de Finetti devoted to the analysis of the effects
of considering as admissible finitely additive laws. See [14]. The title of the paper,
“Sui passaggi al limite nel calcolo delle probabilita`”, could be translated into “On
the limit processes in the calculus of probability” and evokes the continuity property
of countably additive laws. Its content is carefully described and critically anno-
tated in Section 4. This follows a discussion, in Section2, on the development of
de Finetti’s ideas and achievements in probability theory between 1927, the year of
his graduation, and 1930, the year of the publication of “Sui passaggi ...”. For a more
comprehensive illustration of de Finetti’s work, see [9]. Section 3 provides a concise
description of the mathematical theory of probability deduced from de Finetti’s
coherence principle. See [22].
The present author is not aware of how “Sui passaggi ...” was received by the
Italian scientific community. However, the fact that it was not published in the
journal Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei might conceal a cold reaction
by the most influential Italian probabilist of the time, namely Francesco Paolo
Cantelli (1875-1966). It is well-known that Cantelli was not enthusiastic about non
countably additive probabilities. See [4] and [5, 6, 7]. A public reaction on the spur
of the moment came from the famous French mathematician Maurice Fre´chet (1878-
1973) who initiated an interesting correspondence with de Finetti gathered into four
published notes. See [15, 16], [29, 30]. The reading of this correspondence provides
a vivid insight into the stances of the two “competitors” that reflect two different
ways of thinking still of great interest. Then, this correspondence is reported and
annotated in the present paper as well. See Section 5.
I am delighted I am given the chance to write this work in honour of Joe Eaton
who devoted a distinguished part of his scientific research to the foundations of
probability and statistics.
2. De Finetti and other probabilists at the end of the twenties
De Finetti started coping with the fundamental task of formulating a satisfactory
and general theory of probability right after his graduation. Almost in the same
period he initiated his studies on the sequences of exchangeable events and on
functions with independent, stationary increments (f.i.s.i., for short). But, whilst
his investigations on these specific topics proceeded rapidly – cf., e.g., [49] and
[1] – the research on the foundations of probability appeared somewhat bristling
with difficulties. The major challenge arose from the mathematical formulation
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of the subjectivistic conception of probability as expounded, from a philosophical
viewpoint, in [21], an essay that had already been drawn up at the beginning of 1930.
That time lag did not restrain him from reaching considerable achievements, but
led him to a retrospective critical reflection on some of his own results, that he had
obtained within the realm of countably additive probabilities. This happened during
the second half of 1929, when he reached the conclusion that such a condition is not
necessary in order that a function on a class of events can be viewed as a probability.
Indeed the presentations, at the R. Accademia dei Lincei, of [12] and [13] are the
7th of October and the 1st of December, respectively. The precise deduction of the
characterizing properties of a probability law, from the subjectivistic standpoint,
were announced in both the replies to Fre´chet. See [15, 16] and [22] for the final
version.
It is worth providing some further insight into this story. By assuming the con-
tinuity of the law of a f.i.s.i. based on Gaussian finite–dimensional distributions,
in [11] de Finetti had stated that almost every trajectory turns out to be nowhere
differentiable: a result today ascribed to Paley, Wiener and Zygmund. See [45].
Subsequently, he had shown that the probability distribution (p.d.) of Xt is con-
tinuous, for each t > 0, whenever (Xt)t≥0 is a continuous f.i.s.i.. See [12]. A first
clear statement of his concerns about the suitability of an analysis confined to
considering random functions governed by countably additive laws can be found
in [13] where he deals with the problem of determining the p.d. of the integral,
on [0, t], of a f.i.s.i.. See next Section 4. It is in this last essay that he announces
the preparation of Sui Passaggi, with the purpose of investigating the issue from
a more general viewpoint. It seems fair to say that Sui Passaggi marks a turning
point in de Finetti’s mathematical treatment of probability. After hinting at the
possible effects of such an afterthought on his own work, we linger on describing
the boundary conditions within which it matured.
As to the Italian scientific community, it has been already mentioned that Can-
telli claimed to be unconditionally in favour of countable additivity. As an example,
in his celebrated paper on the strong law of large numbers – see [4] – he had declared
“Such an assumption plainly cannot raise objections from a theoretical viewpoint,
and corresponds to the feeling that probability, viewed from an empirical angle,
arouses in us”. He made no mention of the fundamental problem of the existence
of a countably additive extension of sequences of assigned finite–dimensional laws
of (X1, . . . , Xn), for n = 1, 2, . . ., to obtain a probability law for (Xn)n≥1. See also
[50] and [48]. We do not know whether he ignored or not the existence of such a
problem that was completely solved later by Kolmogorov. See [40]. In fact, it was
only in 1932 that Cantelli proposed a measure–theoretic approach with an explicit
view to proving existence of extensions like the previous one. See, in particular, [44],
which includes one of the main achievements within the so–called Cantelli abstract
theory of probability. As far as the issue of interpreting the meaning of probability is
concerned, Cantelli swung between an empirical interpretation and a bent for find-
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ing conceptual connections between his abstract theory and the classical Laplace
definition. It is for sure that he had no sympathy for subjectivistic interpretations.
As regards his interactions with the broader international scientific community,
de Finetti has been keeping up correspondences with some of the foreign foremost
scholars such as Fre´chet, Le´vy, Khinchin and Kolmogorov since the end of the
20’s. It is well–known, for example, that Alexandr Y. Khinchin (1894–1959) took
interest in the study of sequences of exchangeable events during and after the 8th
International Congress of Mathematicians held in Bologna, 3–10 September, 1928.
See [34, 35]. Andrei N. Kolmogorov (1903-1987), following the theory devised by
de Finetti in ’29, obtained the renowned representation of the characteristic function
of X1, when (Xt)t≥0 is a f.i.s.i. and X1 has finite variance. The starting point for
this research is in [17], whereas the Kolmogorov contribution is contained in [38, 39].
Also the generalization due to Khinchin of the Kolmogorov statement can be viewed,
unlike that given by Le´vy, as a by–product of the de Finetti approach to functions
with independent increments. See [36] and [42]. In the period 1929-1930, de Finetti
focused on a paper by Kolmogorov concerning the representation of associative
means. See [37] and [23]. Both Fre´chet and Evgeny E. Slutsky (1880–1948) were
mentioned by de Finetti for contributions to stochastic convergence: the former for
the study of convergence of random elements in abstract spaces (see [15]), the latter
for the use of the term stochastic that de Finetti adopted to designate convergence
in probability (see [14]). As to Paul Le´vy (1886–1971), it is well–known that he
conceived and developed his fundamental contribution to f.i.s.i.’s independently
of both de Finetti and Kolmogorov. See [43]. On de Finetti’s side, Le´vy’s Calcul
des Probabilite´s (1925) and Castelnuovo’s Calcolo delle Probabilita` e Applicazioni
(1919) were the sole existing reference books at the end of the twenties, gathering the
essentials of the theory and calculus of probability in a systematic way. Like Cantelli,
Le´vy was inclined to restrict probability laws to countably additive functions on
events, and tried to justify his position in the final part of the book.
As to the meaning and the interpretation of the concept of probability, the span
of time we are dealing with overlaps with the success of the so–called empirical
conceptions, according to which probability is related to frequency. This position
was defended, in those years, by great scientists like Guido Castelnuovo (1865–1952)
and Richard von Mises (1883–1953). See, for example, [53]. De Finetti had found
the empirical arguments incomplete and inadequate since the very beginning of
his own approaching the probabilistic studies. Unsatisfied, he followed a different
path that led him to the formulation of a radically subjectivistic theory, with the
consequence that countable additivity is not necessary in order that a set function
may be considered a probability. A brief description of de Finetti’s theory will be
sketched in the next section. We conclude the present one with a digression about
the spread of basic elementary concepts in the literature of the day, by means of
an example. The research into the subject has been suggested by the reading of
Sui Passaggi and regards, in particular, definition and properties of convergence in
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probability.
In Section 8 of that paper, de Finetti reminds the reader of a definition given in
[13] – the definition of convergence in probability of sequences of random numbers –
and proves that convergence in probability entails convergence in distribution. It
will be explained, in Section 4, why he had been led to deal with this arrangement of
topics. Here we want to comment on the fact that in neither of the two papers does
he mention any reference and he proposes to designate the concept by the locution
convergenza stocasticamente uniforme (stochastically uniform convergence). Com-
bining this circumstance with the fact that de Finetti was used to carefully mention
references, including those having little bearing on the development of his own re-
search, one is led to conclude that the concept of convergence in probability was
not yet a part of the probabilistic literature at the time. This may seem amazing.
It is worth recalling that the topic of convergence of sequences of random numbers
had generated heated controversies, not yet dulled at the end of the twenties. A
significant part of the contention can be traced back to Cantelli’s determination
in claiming his priority, over Emile Borel (1871–1956), for the formulation of the
strong law of large numbers. See, for example, [50] and references therein. Stimu-
lated by the draft of the present paper, we have thoroughly examined the literature
of that time and we have got to the conclusion that de Finetti was probably the first
to consider sequences having a random number as a limit. Moreover, one should
acknowledge his priority in proving that convergence in probability is stronger than
convergence in distribution. The statement on page 25 of [50], according to which
“Cantelli (1916) had anticipated Slutsky (1925) in introducing a random variable
(rather than just a constant) as a limit ... of convergence in probability”, does not
seem correct. Indeed, on the one hand, Cantelli in [3] deals with constant limits
only –see also [5] – and, on the other hand, Slutsky in [51] considers only sequences
of the type (Xn −mn)n≥1 converging to zero for some sequence (mn)n≥1 of real
numbers (stochastische Asymptote). A more delicate analysis must be devoted to
the Fre´chet work on convergence of random sequences. It is Fre´chet himself who
gave notice, in his comments on Sui Passaggi that were presented on the 3rd of
July 1930 at the Reale Istituto Lombardo, of a work of his having some points of
contact with de Finetti’s paper. He did not mention the title of his article, which
was referred to as a summary of his recent courses, and announced it was going to
appear in the (Italian) statistics journal Metron. Indeed, it was published in the
last issue of that year. See [29] and [31]. In the meantime, de Finetti has come by
the Fre´chet paper: this is witnessed by the fact he touches upon it in his reply to
the Fre´chet first group of comments on Sui Passaggi. De Finetti confines himself to
saying that, apart from what is consequence of the assumption of countable addi-
tivity, he has particularly appreciated the study of the convergence of sequences of
random elements taking values in abstract metric spaces. See the last part of [31].
The first sections contain accurate descriptions of the concepts of convergence in
probability and of almost sure convergence for sequences of random numbers. As to
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the former, the definition is obviously the very same as that previously proposed,
under different name, by de Finetti. Moreover, also the Fre´chet work contains a
proof of the fact that convergence in probability entails convergence in distribu-
tion. The funny thing is that he omits giving precise references to the points of
contact with Sui Passaggi. In fact, he just mentions works by Slutsky, Dell’Agnola
and de Finetti, without specifying either titles or other bibliographical data. He
justifies these omissions by writing that “... nous n’avons pu consulter assez libre-
ment et comple`tement les publications de M. Slutsky ... Par contre les me´moires
de M.M. Dell’Agnola et de Finetti ne nous paraissent pas consacre´s aux meˆmes
questions que celles qui ont e´te´ traite´es ici.” Such a comment is not appropriate
either for the Dell’Agnola paper [27] or for Sui Passaggi. But, while the former will
be mentioned in Chapter 5 of [32], de Finetti’s contribution will be ignored even
on that occasion, in spite of the anything but negligible overlapping. So, de Finetti
was probably the first to introduce a general definition of convergence in probabil-
ity and to study its connections with convergence in law, but Fre´chet was closely
following him on this path. Situations of this type are not infrequent in de Finetti’s
scientific production. Other noteworthy examples are represented by: (i) the con-
cept of inifinitely divisble law, introduced to encapsulate the characterizing feature
of the law of X1 in a stochastic f.i.s.i. (Xt)t≥0 (see [11, 17]); (ii) the completion
of the continuity theorem for characteristic functions, to provide the first proof of
the renowned representation theorem for exchangeable events (see [19]); (iii) the
extension of the Kolmogorov theorem for associative means (see [23]); (iv) the an-
ticipation of the so–called Kendall’s τ coefficient, in a general study on correlation
and concordance (see [24]); (v) a pioneering use, almost contemporaneously with
Le´vy, of the notions of martingale, stopping time and optional sampling, to re-
formulate the Lundberg–Crame´r theory of risk, without coining any new locution
to designate them (see [25]). The recurrence of these circumstances is the result
of a combination of his special mathematical inventiveness with the fact that, as
he wrote himself, “he was interested in mathematics meant as a tool for applica-
tions ... and for the investigation of conceptual and critical issues ..., rather than
as formalism or as an abstract subject, axiomatized and withdrawn in itself.” See
Page XVIII of [26]. This attitude prevented him from isolating results that were
merely proved with a view to the solution of a more general problem. It also made
it difficult to acknowledge the paternity of a number of scientific innovations.
3. De Finetti’s coherence principle
Responding to Fre´chet’s second series of remarks, de Finetti claims that the most
significant point of the question on additivity lies in the need of proofs for the
properties (of probability) that one wishes to affirm. See [16]. For those who, like
us, are accostumed to affirm those properties by means of axioms, de Finetti’s
recommendation might appear as the fruit of an outdated way of thinking. However,
it is plain to see that it represents the most reasonable way to settle the dispute
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constructively. Then, he asks every author to provide a proof of one’s own, consistent
with a well-specified conceptual starting point. For a complete understanding of the
coming sections, it is useful to recall the solution to which de Finetti himself always
made reference, starting from the end of 1929. See [18] and [22].
He maintains probability assessments definitely have a subjectivistic source, but
one can conceive the following ideal experiment to check on the closeness of a real–
valued function P , defined on a class E of events, to one’s authentic opinions on
the uncertainty of the elements of E . One ought to think of {P (E) : E ∈ E } as
a system of unit prices to have bets on the events included in E . More precisely,
if one is willing to accept bets of any amount (either positive or negative) at the
unit prices fixed by the above system, then P represents the desired quantification
of one’s judgments. De Finetti assumes an ounce of rationality, in the sense that P
is required to ensure that there is no choice of c1, . . . , cn in R and of E1, . . . , En in
E such that sup
∑n
k=1 ck{P (Ek)−1Ek} < 0, where sup is taken with respect to all
the elements (elementary events) of the partition of the sure event Ω generated by
{E1, . . . , En}, and 1E denotes the indicator function of the event E. Indeed, with
this notation,
∑n
k=1 ck{P (Ek) − 1Ek} represents the gain from a combination of
bets of amount c1, . . . , cn on E1, . . . , En, respectively. These remarks led de Finetti
to restrict the class of admissible probability laws, on E , to those which obey the
coherence principle, i.e.:
For all finite subsets {Ei : i ∈ I} of E and {ci : i ∈ I} of R, P satisfies
(1) sup
∑
i∈I
ci{P (Ei)− 1Ei} ≥ 0
with sup taken with respect to all elementary events relative to {Ei : i ∈ I}.
Any P satisfying this property is said to be a probability on E .
Existence of at least one probability law on E is proved in [18]. It is of great
interest the fact that coherence is well-defined, independently of the structure of E .
Moreover, as proved in [18], any probability on E admits a coherent extension to
any larger class of events.
As to the properties that one wishes to affirm, with a view to the calculus of
probabilities, it is easy to prove that coherence entails:
(π1) If Ω ∈ E , then P (Ω) = 1
(π2) P (E) ≥ 0 for every E in E
(π1) If E1, E2 and E1 ∪ E2 are in E , with E1 ∩ E2 = ∅, then
P (E1 ∪E2) = P (E1) + P (E2).
Moreover: If E is an algebra, then (π1), (π2) and (π3) are also sufficient in order
that P : E → R can be considered a probability. See [22].
That is de Finetti’s proof that countable additivity is not necessary for a function
to be a probability on an algebra of events.
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It would be misleading to consider countable families of bets with the purpose
of extending additivity to countable families of pairwise disjoint events. Indeed, if
one proceeds in this direction, it would be necessary to introduce extra–conditions,
completely extraneous to the common interpretation of the term probability, in
order to give a precise and unambiguous meaning to the gain.
To conclude, we mention a couple of facts that are of importance for understand-
ing a few of the coming examples. Let (Pn)n≥1 be a sequence of probabilities on E
and let L := {E ∈ E : limn→∞ Pn(E) exists} 6= ∅. Then Q(E) := limn→∞ Pn(E)
is a probability on L . It should be noted that Q is not necessarily countably addi-
tive even if each Pn is countably additive. The second fact to be considered herein is
concerned with the general theory of stochastic processes. De Finetti has frequently
referred to it, even if tacitly, in his already mentioned papers on random functions.
Only at the end of the last century it was noticed and encapsulated into a theorem
by Lester E. Dubins (1920–2010). See [28]. Define two (real–valued) random func-
tions on [0,+∞) to be cousins if the family J of finite–dimensional p.d.’s of one of
the functions is the same as the J of the other random function. Dubins proves that
each random function, in particular the Brownian motion, has a cousin almost all
of whose paths are polynomials, another cousin almost all of whose paths are step
functions (on each bounded time–interval, they only have a finite number of values,
each assumed on a finite union of intervals) that are continuous on the right (on the
left), and a fourth cousin almost all of whose paths are continuous, piecewise–linear
functions. Hence, in the next sections there will be no contradiction when, referring
to de Finetti, continuous random functions will be considered with independent
and stationary increments, different from the Brownian motion.
4. Presentation and critical comment of Sui Passaggi
The paper we are now going to analyze consists of nine sections. The first three are
devoted to the explanation of some elementary facts concerning p.d. functions: these
provide simple illustrations of how certain conclusions, valid for countably additive
probabilities, do not generally hold any more for finitely additive probabilities.
Sections 4 to 8 deal with convergence of sequences of random variables and include
interesting , and somewhat amazing, remarks about the Cantelli strong law of large
numbers. Finally, in Section 9, de Finetti goes back over the problem that had led
him to the reflection developed in the previous sections: Is the p.d. of the integral
of a random function equal to the limit of the laws of the integral sums?
4.1. Discussion of Sections 1–3
De Finetti starts with the p.d. function of a random number X , defined as
F (x) = P{X < x} (x ∈ R)
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and lingers on the correct interpretation of the discontinuity points of F , within a
finitely additive framework. In order to avoid unnecessary complications, think of
P as a probability on 2Ω, Ω being a set and X a real–valued function defined on Ω.
See the previous section for the definition and the existence of a probability on 2Ω,
and for de Finetti’s attitude with respect to the general theory of probability at
the end of 1929, when he was writing Sui Passaggi. In particular, he was perfectly
aware of the existence of probabilities P such that P (D) = 1 and P ({x}) = 0 for
some countable D ⊂ Ω and for every x in D. Since this will occur quite often in
discussing de Finetti’s paper, we now indicate a way to obtain probabilities of that
type.
Example 4.1. Let D be a countably infinite subset of Ω, say D = {x1, x2, . . .},
and let Pn be a probability on 2
Ω defined by
Pn(A) :=
♯(A ∩Dn)
n
(A ⊂ Ω)
with Dn := {x1, . . . , xn}. Write L := {A ⊂ Ω : limn→∞ ♯(A ∩Dn)/n exists} and
set P (A) := limn→∞ Pn(A) for every A in L . As recalled in the previous section,
P is a probability on L and, then, it admits a coherent extension γ on 2Ω such
that γ({xk}) = 0 and γ(D) = 1.
We are in a position to discuss the main issue of the present section, i.e. the cor-
rect interpretation of discontinuity for a p.d. function, within the frame established
in Section 3. Under the ordinary condition of countable additivity, for any d of such
type one would get F (d − 0) = F (d) = P{X < d} < F (d + 0) = P{X ≤ d} and,
consequently, F (d+ 0)− F (d− 0) would represent the probability concentrated in
{d}. This statement is not necessarily true if P is just finitely additive: in this case,
one can only say that the following chain of inequalities holds true:
(2) F (d− 0) ≤ P{X < d} ≤ P{X ≤ d} ≤ F (d+ 0)
along with F (d− 0) < F (d+ 0) if d is a discontinuity point.
What de Finetti points out as a frequent mistake – in which, as recalled in
Section 2, he himself had been trapped – the fact that many authors resorted to
passages to the limit without preventive proof of the necessity of any condition
justifying the limit processes along monotone sequences of events. Assuming either
of the equalities F (d− 0) = P{X < d}, F (d+ 0) = P{X ≤ d} might be an istance
of that mistake, as displayed in the following example drawn from Sui Passaggi.
Example 4.2. Let Ω = R and (xn)n≥1 be a sequence with xn+1 < xn, for every
n, and xn ↓ 0. Define D and γ as in the previous Example 4.1, and the random
number X by X(ω) = ω for every ω in Ω = R. Then, the p.d. function F of X
satisfies F (x) = 1 − P{X ≥ x} = 1 for every x > 0, and F (x) = P{X ≤ x} = 0
for every x ≤ 0. So, the jump (= 1) of F at d = 0 does not represent a mass
concentrated in {0}.
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This example shows that the inequality to the right of (2) cannot be replaced by
equality, excepting special cases. To see that an analogous remark can be made for
the inequality to the left, it is enough to consider the case of a sequence (yn)n≥1
with yn < yn+1 for every n and yn ↑ 0. Now, replacing P with a probability Q
for which Q({yk}) = 0 for every k and Q({y1, y2, . . . , }) = 1, the consequent p.d.
function G of X satisfies G(x) = 0 for x < 0 and G(0) = 1 = P{X < 0}. It should
also be noted that H := pF +(1− p)G is a p.d. function for each p in [0, 1], and for
every p in (0, 1) inequalities under discussion hold on both sides of (2) when F is
replaced by H and P by pP + (1 − p)Q. It is also straightforward to find variants
exhibiting concentrated masses, which satisfy
P{X = d} < F (d+ 0)− F (d− 0).
As to the behaviour of a p.d. function F at −∞ (+∞, respectively), what can be
said, in general terms, is that limx→−∞ F (x) ≥ 0 (limx→+∞ F (x) ≤ 1, respectively),
strict inequalities being possible,
4.2. Discussion of Sections 4–9
In Sections 4–6, de Finetti discusses an important case in which, on the basis of
the tacit assumption of continuity for probabilities, authors of the time were led
to endow strong laws of large numbers with a meaning more general than one’s
due. De Finetti focuses on Cantelli’s proof of the convergence of the frequency of
success relative to n trials, in a sequence of Bernoulli trials, as n goes to infinity.
To tackle the problem in the usual terms, define Ω to be the set of all sequences
d := (dn)n≥1, each dn being 0 or 1. Then, for each n define the n–th projection
pn(d) := dn (d ∈ Ω), and set
fn(d) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
pj(d).
Then, fn represents the frequency of 1 in the first n trials. Let P be any probability
on 2Ω such that
P ({d ∈ Ω : p1(d) = e1, . . . , pn(d) = en}) = p
∑
n
i=1
ei(1− p)n−
∑
n
i=1
ei
where (e1, . . . , en) is any point in {0, 1}
n, with n = 1, 2, . . ., p some fixed point in
[0, 1], and provided that 00 = 1. Under these conditions, which imply that (pn)n≥1
is a Bernoulli sequence, Cantelli had proved that, for every ε, δ > 0, there is n0 =
n0(ε, δ) such that
(3) inf
m≥1
P
({
max
n≤k≤n+m
|fk − p| ≤ ε
})
≥ 1− δ
holds for any n ≥ n0.
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It must be said that assessments of P for which
inf
m≥1
P
({
max
n≤k≤n+m
|fk − p| ≤ ε
})
= P
({
max
k≥n
|fk − p| ≤ ε
})
,
obtained by interchanging limm→∞ with P , are consistent with the Bernoulli as-
sumptions even in the frame of de Finetti’s theory, but they are not the sole. In
particular, there are assessments for which one cannot say that (fn)n≥1 converges
to p with probability one, even though (3) is obviously valid. In Section 5 de Finetti
illustrates the situation by means of the following interesting example.
Example 4.3. In the space Ω of all sequences d, each dn being 0 or 1, define
Sn to be the set of all sequences (e1, . . . , en−1, 1, 0, 0, . . .) obtained, for each n ≥ 2,
as (e1, . . . , en−1) varies in {0, 1}
n−1. Moreover, set S1 := {1, 0, 0, . . .}. So Ω1 :=
∪n≥1Sn is the set of all sequences in Ω with a place occupied by 1 and followed by
an entire sequence of 0’s. Now, consider the sequence (Qn)n≥1 of probabilities on
2Ω defined by Q1(S1) = 1 and, for any n ≥ 2
Qn({e1, . . . , en−1, 1, 0, 0, . . .}) = p
∑
n−1
i=1
ei(1− p)n−1−
∑
n−1
i=1
ei
for any (e1, . . . , en−1) in {0, 1}
n−1. Clearly Qn(Sn) = 1 for every n ≥ 1. Finally,
consider the probability γ of Example 4.1, with Ω = N := {1, 2, . . .} and, for any
subset A of Ω, set
Q(A) :=
∫
N
Qn(A) γ(dn)
the integral being meant in the sense of Riemann-Stieltjes as explained, for exam-
ple, in [47]. It is easy to verify that Qn({p1 = e1, . . . , pN = eN}) = p
∑
N
i=1
ei(1 −
p)N−
∑
N
i=1
ei holds true for every n ≥ N + 1 and, since γ({N + 1, N + 2, . . .}) = 1
for every N , one gets
Q({p1 = e1, . . . , pN = eN}) =
∫
{n≥N+1}
Qn({p1 = e1, . . . , pN = eN}) γ(dn)
= p
∑
N
i=1
ei(1− p)N−
∑
N
i=1
ei .
This is tantamount to saying that (pn)n≥1 is a Bernoulli sequence with respect to
Q. Then, (3) continues to be valid with Q in the place of P . Moreover, for each d
in Ω1 := ∪n≥1Sn one has
fn(d)→ 0 as n→∞.
Thus, since Q(Ω1) =
∫
N
Qn(∪k≥1Sk) γ(dn) ≥
∫
N
Qn(Sn) γ(dn) = 1, one sees that
(fn)n≥1 converges to zero almost surely, and not to p.
The phenomenon highlighted in the previous example can be explained in the
following terms. There is an instant n beyond which each trial turns into a failure
(= 0). One is not able to predict when such an instant happens but, according
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to the definition of γ, n is viewed as immensely distant. Hence, the probability of
events which depend on any finite number of trials are not affected by the instant
the sequence becomes a sequences of 0’s. An analogous example has been provided,
more recently, by Ramakrishnan and Sudderth in [46]. See also the instructive final
Remarks therein, apropos of the common opinion on finitely additive probabilities.
As pointed out by de Finetti himself, one can change the sequence of 0’s which,
in Example 4.3, follows the last 1, in such a way that (3) still continues to be valid
and, at the same time, fn converges or does not: in the former case, it converges
to a random variable with a prefixed p.d. function. For the sake of completeness,
de Finetti’s paper is here supplemented with a couple of additional examples of
that type.
Example 4.4 (a) Let Ω be defined as in Example 4.3. Moreover, let (yn)n≥1 be
the sequence defined by
yj =


0 if j ∈ {(2n− 1)!, (2n− 1)! + 1, . . . , (2n)!− 1}
1 if j ∈ {(2n)!, (2n)! + 1, . . . , (2n+ 1)!− 1}
for n = 1, 2, . . .. Replace the sets S1, S2, . . . of Example 4.3 by
S∗1 := {(1, y1, y2, . . .)}
and, for n ≥ 2,
S∗n := {(e1, . . . , en−1, 1, y1, ys, . . .) : (e1, . . . , en−1) ∈ {0, 1}
n−1}.
Now, for each n, set
Nν := n+ (2ν)!− 1, Mν := n+ (2ν + 1)!− 1 (ν = 1, 2, . . .).
Then, for every sequence in S∗n, one has
(4)


fNν =
{(2ν−1)!+n−1} fMν−1
n+(2ν)!−1 → 0 (ν →∞)
fMν =
{(2ν)!+n−1} fNν+2ν(2ν)!
n+(2ν+1)!−1 → 1 (ν →∞).
Define probabilities Q∗1, Q
∗
2, . . . on 2
Ω according to
Q∗1({(1, y1, y2, . . .}) = 1
and, for n ≥ 2,
Q∗n({e1, . . . , en−1, 1, y1, y2, . . .}) = p
∑
n−1
i=1
ei(1− p)n−1−
∑
n−1
i=1
ei .
Then, set
Q∗(A) :=
∫
N
Q∗n(A) γ(dn) (A ⊂ Ω).
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It is easy to prove that (pn)n≥1 is a Bernoulli sequence even with respect to Q
∗.
Hence, (3) is valid even with Q∗ in the place of Q. On the other hand, in view of (4),
for each sequence in Ω∗1 one has lim inf fn = 0 < lim sup fn = 1, and Q(Ω
∗
1) = 1.
(b) Maintain the meaning for Ω, γ and (fn)n≥1. Denote by C the subset of Ω on
which (fn)n≥1 converges and by H a prefixed p.d. function, supported by [0, 1].
Finally, let σ be a σ–additive probability measure on B({0, 1}∞ ∩C) such that
σ({p1 = e1, . . . , pn = en}) =
∫
[0,1]
θ
∑
n
i=1
ei(1 − θ)n−
∑
n
i=1
ei dH(θ)
for any (e1, . . . , en) ∈ {0, 1}
n and n ≥ 1. Now, define
S∗∗n := {(e1, . . . , en−1, 1, s) : (e1, . . . , en−1) ∈ {0, 1}
n−1, s ∈ C} (n ≥ 2)
S∗∗1 := {(1, s) : s ∈ C}
together with the probabilities
Q∗∗1 ({1} ×A) := σ(A)
Q∗∗n ({e1, . . . , en−1, 1} ×A) = βn−1({e1, . . . , en−1})σ(A)
for any A in B({0, 1}∞ ∩ C), (e1, . . . , en−1) ∈ {0, 1}
n−1, n ≥ 2 and
βn−1({e1, . . . , en−1}) = p
∑
n−1
i=1
ei(1− p)n−1−
∑
n−1
i=1
ei .
Finally,
Q∗∗(A) :=
∫
N
Q∗∗n (A) γ(dn) (A ⊂ Ω).
Once again, (pn)n≥1 turns out to be a Bernoulli sequence with respect to Q
∗∗
and, then, (3) is valid with Q∗∗ in the place of Q. On the other hand, in view of
de Finetti’s theory of exchangeable sequences, Q∗∗(Ω∗∗1 ) = 1 with Ω
∗∗
1 = ∪n≥1S
∗∗
n ,
and (fn)n≥1 converges, on Ω
∗∗
1 , to a random number whose p.d. function is H .
The last two groups of examples have an important element in common. They
show that there are sequences of random numbers either converging almost surely
or oscillating almost surely, with p.d. functions converging weakly in both cases to
a p.d. function which differs from the p.d. function of the almost sure limit: The
former, in those examples, has a jump invariably equal to 1 at p, whereas the latter
can be let varying in the class of all p.d. functions. De Finetti explains why he was
interested in investigating into these phenomena in the last section of Sui Passaggi.
In the second half of 1929 he was about to deduce the p.d. of the integral of a
continuous stochastic f.i.s.i. as limit of the p.d. functions of integral sums which
converge pointwise to the integral of interest. At this point, he was assailed by the
doubt that such a line of reasoning could be in conflict with his way of thinking of
probability, in the sense that the argument could be valid for specific extensions of a
prefixed system of finite–dimensional laws, but not in general. The above examples
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confirmed the reasonableness of his doubt. Here we faithfully follow [13] and provide
the reader with some further insight on this aspect.
Let t 7→ X(t) be a random function, for t ≥ 0, with continuous trajectories such
that X(0) ≡ c. See Section 3. Then, for each t > 0, one can write∫ t
0
X(u) du = lim
n→∞
t
n
n∑
h=1
X
(
th
n
)
where, by the Brunacci–Abel identity,
Vn :=
t
n
n∑
h=1
X
(
th
n
)
= ct+
t
n
n∑
h=1
(n− h+ 1)
{
X
(
th
n
)
−X
(
t(h− 1)
n
)}
.
Then, if X is a f.i.s.i., as proved in [11], the characteristic function of the increment
{X( thn )−X(
t(h−1)
n )} is given by φ( · )
t/n, with φ( · ) being the characteristic function
of X(1). Then, for the characteristic function ΨVn of Vn one gets
LogΨVn(ξ) = icξt+
t
n
n∑
h=1
Logφ
(
(n− h+ 1)
t
n
ξ
)
(ξ ∈ R)
where Log denotes the principal branch of the logarithm. Then, limn→∞ΨVn exists,
uniformly on compact intervals, and is given by
(5) exp
{
icξt+
1
ξ
∫ ξt
0
Log (φ(u)) du
}
.
After proving that such a limit is a characteristic function, de Finetti can assert
that Vn converges in distribution, but he cannot state that (5) is the characteristic
function of limn Vn =
∫ t
0
X(u) du. In fact, in [2] it is shown that, in the frame
of de Finetti’s theory as summarized in Section 3,
∫ 1
0
X(u) du can be given any
p.d. when, for example, X has the finite–dimensional distributions of the standard
Brownian motion.
As a natural development of the previous remarks, de Finetti tries to find inter-
esting types of convergence of a sequence (Xn)n≥1 of random numbers to a random
number X , which entails weak convergence of the p.d. functions of the Xn’s to
the p.d. of X . It is apropos of this question that he introduced the general notion
of stochastic uniform convergence (namely convergence in probability) in [13] and
proved that it meets the above property, with respect to weak convergence, in Sec-
tion 8 of [14]. See the previous Section 2. Coming back to the problem of the law
of the integral of a random function, he concludes Sui Passaggi touching on special
cases in which one can verify that (Vn)n≥1 converges in probability to
∫ t
0
X(u) du.
This is the case when, for example, X is non–decreasing.
5. Ensuing correspondence between de Finetti and Fre´chet
The correspondence consists of four short open letters published in Rendiconti del
Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere and presented in two meetings of the
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Istituto: The first and the second, by Fre´chet and de Finetti respectively, were
presented on the 3rd of July 1930, whereas the third and the fourth, by Fre´chet
and de Finetti respectively, on the 20th of November 1930.
In his first note, Fre´chet begins by saying that Sui Passaggi is an interesting
paper, which has points of contact with topics he has been dealing with in his
recent courses (1929-1930). These were summarized in an article still in press at
the beginning of July: that is the paper [31], mentioned in Section 2 and published
in last issue of Metron of that very same year. Fre´chet agrees with de Finetti on the
fact that countable additivity cannot be deduced from finite additivity, and that
the latter constitutes a principle generally accepted as a basis for the theory and the
calculus of probabilities. But he has a different opinion about the admissibility of
probabilities that are not countably additive. He explains this attitude by referring
to the alternative arisen to the founders of the modern theory of measure. They, in
spite of the awareness of the impossibility of the problem of measure highlighted by
the celebrated Vitali example (see [52]), opted for countable additivity restricted
to suitable domains. Fre´chet holds this way of proceeding up as an example, and
proposes introducing the idea of “e´ve´nements qui ont une probabilite´ de´termine´e et
d’autres qui n’en auront pas”, provided that the condition of countable additivity is
admitted by definition. Then, he asserts that in such a case, the events considered
by de Finetti in his examples do not have a “probabilite´ determine´e”, and concludes
that it is in this circumstance that the solution to the questions raised by de Finetti
must be sought.
In his answer, de Finetti respectfully tries to bring the debate down to the real
question: To decide if all finitely additive probabilities are admissible, or alter-
natively if it is necessary to restrict admissible probabilities to the laws that are
countably additive. He says he has the sense that several authors, dealing with this
subject, consider themselves free to decide according to what suits them best. As
an example of this attitude, he mentions the Fre´chet evocation of an analogy with
the theory of measure. Taking his cue from this, de Finetti says he considers it un-
justified to make use of conventions to define concepts, like probability, that have
a proper meaning, even if possibly open to dispute. Then, the main issue does not
consist of making more or less arbitrary conventions on certain properties, but can
be traced back to proving that certain properties are necessary. As mentioned in
Section 3, de Finetti derived the necessity of finite additivity from a coherence prin-
ciple which, far from being merely conventional, corresponds to a prevailing rational
attitude. To say that an event E has probability p either has a more or less common
intuitive meaning, or is a perfectly useless sentence. In the first case, if we have a
countable family of mutually disjoint events (E1, E2, . . .), with P (En) = 0 for every
n, are we able to conclude that E := ∪n≥1En has probability 0, or, equivalently,
that E is invariably practically impossible? It is plain that this is not a convention
matter, since the above conclusion has a real conceptual content. It can be false or
true, but this must be proved, not assumed by a convention. De Finetti admits a
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quite serious difficulty in doing this, due to the lack, until then, of a general theory
of probability. He takes the advantage of this circumstance to announce that he
has completed a theory, which, starting from a method for assessing probabilities
[betting scheme, auth. note], allows one to impeccably deduce the mathematical
properties of probability. This is clearly a reference to the theory outlined in the
previous Section 3. He recalls that, within such a theory, countable additivity is
not a necessary requisite for admissibility and, then, all the examples given in Sui
Passaggi are perfectly justified and make sense. He concludes with a mention to
a couple of consequences, that he considers bizarre, of the adoption of countable
additivity as a compulsory principle for admissibility of probability laws. The first
consequence relates to the fact that such a principle would forbid one to think of
a sequence of mutually disjoint events, forming a partition of the sure event and
having probabilities of the same order of magnitude. In other words, that sequence
invariably ought to include a finite subset with respect to which the whole of the
remaining events would be negligible. The second bizarre consequence of assuming,
as a compulsory principle, countable additivity is that one cannot say that the weak
limit of a sequence of p.d. functions is always a p.d. function.
The “official” reply by Fre´chet to the previous de Finetti’s arguments was sub-
mitted for publication on the 20th of November 1930. The abstract is categoric but
the content of the paper is kept to the point more than the first letter. As to the
abstract, he writes that de Finetti’s examples are inadmissible, on the basis of the
following facts: First, the probabilities of the events considered therein cannot be
expressed by real numbers. Second, the probability laws studied therein are incon-
sistent with empirical experience. Fre´chet splits his criticism into four points, and
de Finetti answers them in the same order. The final part of this section is accord-
ingly organized into four subsections, each of which summarizes both the Fre´chet
critical remark and the de Finetti answer pertaining to the point in title of the
subsection.
Point 1. Fre´chet (F in the sequel) says that de Finetti (dF in the sequel) has
proved, by simple examples, that it is not possible to define a probability for all
the events while complying, at the same time, with the condition of countable
additivity for all classes of mutually disjoint events. Then, he insists on the point,
already mentioned in his first letter, that the question can be solved by introducing
suitable restrictions on the class of the events equipped with a probability, in such
a way that countable additivity is preserved.
dF replies that F has misunderstood his thought. Indeed, he maintains, on the
one hand, that it is always possible to comply with the principle of countable
additivity and that, on the other hand, all the laws that meet the principle of
coherence are admissible. The first part of this argument is not in contrast with
the Vitali theorem, which simply excludes that a countably additive law might
give equal probabilities to all superposable subsets of [0, 1]. Then, to overcome the
drawback, it is not necessary to restrict the class of the admissible events. Moreover,
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such a strategy is not so much as sufficient. To see this, reconsider Example 4.1
with Ω = (0, 1] and x1 = 1, x2 = 1/2, x3 = 1/3, ... and form the partition of (0, 1]
in the intervals given by (1/2, 1], (1/3, 1/2], ..., (1/(n + 1), 1/n], ... . Then, since
P ({x1, . . . , xn, . . .}) = 1, one gets P ((0, 1]) = 1, but P ((1/(n + 1), 1/n]) = 0 for
every n. In other words, the “drawback” of countable partitions of Ω, into elements
having zero probabilities, can occur even if these elements are intervals, which,
according to F, constitute the most typical example of “probabilizable events”.
It is at this point that dF drops the artificial examples suggested by the theory
of measure, to explain how more concrete situations, pertaining to the study of
functions with random increments, are open to the same objections as those raised
in the previous more schematic examples. To this end, dF mentions two cases.
One of them involves the notion of conglomerability and, hence, goes beyond the
scope of the present paper. The original paper in which that phenomenon had been
noticed is [20]. The other case is concerned with the already mentioned de Finetti’s
theorem on the nowhere differentiability of the trajectories of the Brownian motion.
See Section 2. He expresses his regret that, in view of his criticism on the role of
countable additivity, the aforementioned theorem must be reformulated in a weaker
form, i.e.: Let ε and M be strictly positive numbers. Then, the probability that
[0, 1] includes any interval of length greater then ε, for which one gets |X(t2) −
X(t1)| < M(t2− t1), is zero. Since the usual formulation, obtained as M →∞ and
ε → 0, would be very important, if valid in general, dF admits he would be very
happy of the existence of any reasonable argument that persuades him to share
the common idea that probability laws are continuous. He concludes expressing
his skepticism towards the solution devised by F: “Even supposing that there are
events for which the doubts about countable additivity turn out to be groundless,
how could I recognize them in practical situations of the same type as that just
now described.”
Point 2. This corresponds to the first point raised in the above-mentioned abstract.
F seems to admit that restricting the class of the “probabilizable events” does not
serve the purpose to explain the antinomy stressed by de Finetti’s examples. In
order to solve the issue, he proposes to consider probabilities expressed in terms
of actual infinitesimals, say ε. He supposes that, in such a way, one succeeds in
writing ε · ω = 1. dF observes that the adoption of “new numbers” of the type
of ε is not inconsistent with his own way of thinking. In fact, he recalls he has
already made use of those numbers in [10]. But, unlike F, he gets to the conclusion
there is no contradiction between admissibility of infinitesimals and finite additivity.
Indeed, the probability of the union of any finite number of infinitesimal events is
infinitesimal and no limit process could lead to conclude that the probability of the
union of all the events is 1.
Point 3. It corresponds to the second point briefly described in the abstract. F
maintains that probabilities like those of Example 4.1 do not appear when prob-
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abilities are based on frequencies. Moreover, he is skeptical about the success of
dF’s scientific plan, since none of the definitions of probability proposed until then
had met with general approval. So, he refers the reader to the final part of the
Le´vy monograph [41], where countable additivity is, according to his opinion, jus-
tified. Apropos of the first assertion, he claims he is able to prove it in the fol-
lowing terms. Consider a random phenomenon with a countable set of elementary
possible outcomes, say a1, a2, . . ., and assume one can conceive an indefinitely ex-
tendable sequence of trials of that phenomenon. Let f
(n)
k = rk/n be the frequency
of ak in the first n trials. Then, all but a finite number of the f
(n)
k ’s are zero and
f
(n)
1 + f
(n)
2 + · · · = 1. It is palpably clear that such an equality will be valid for any
n. According to the empirical interpretation, as explained in [33], f
(n)
k represents
an “experimental measure” of a probability pk, for every k, as n increases. F claims
that these remarks are sufficient to conclude that p1 + p2 + · · · = 1.
In his reply, dF stresses once again that properties like countable additivity be
proved and not established in the form of conventions. Even if he admits the ex-
istence of the difficulties mentioned by F, he considers them more extrinsic rather
than intrinsic. He says that, to clear this hurdle, it would suffice that every author
would give his own proof, based on his own definition of probability. He acknowl-
edges that this is what F has tried to do, starting from his empirical interpretation
of probability. But, despite the inadequacy of the F proof, dF shows that the F ar-
gument, once made more precise, can become an excellent point in favour of the dF
thesis. As to the inadequacy, assuming that each pk is the (usual) limit, as n→∞,
of (f
(n)
k )n≥1, one can write 1 = limn→∞
∑
k f
(n)
k but, in general, the exchange of
lim with
∑
is not valid. Hence, one can just say, in general, that 1 ≥
∑
k pk. In the
footnote (2) of page 256, dF notes that F had pointed out, in personal correspon-
dence, that he didn’t mean to speak of pk as a limit in a mathematical sense. Once
taken note of this detail, dF resorts to a different argument free from the criticism
of being just in an abstract mathematical form. He sets himself the objective of
studying the expected behaviour of the f
(n)
k ’s, as n goes to infinity, to show that
there are probability laws with respect to which it would be illusory to expect that the
f
(n)
k ’s converge to numbers pk such that
∑
pk = 1. Therefore, in the same way, it
would be illusory to hope to prove that the property of countable additivity may be
derived, in general, from the analogous property valid for frequencies, understood
as empirical estimates of probabilities. Here is the example proposed by dF along
with a few further details.
Example 5.1. Let S be a countably infinite set, say S := {a1, . . . , an, . . .}, and
Ω = S∞. Define ξ1, ξ2, . . . to be the coordinate random variables of Ω. Now, for any
strictly positive integer N , set SN := {a1, . . . , aN} and, for every A ⊂ S
n, define
P
(n)
N (A) =
♯(A ∩ SnN )
Nn
.
It is plain that (Sn, 2S
n
, P
(n)
N )n≥1 is a consistent system of probabilities. Then,
there exists a probability PN on (Ω, 2
Ω) such that PN (A × S
∞) = P
(n)
N (A) holds
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true for every A ⊂ Sn, n = 1, 2, . . .. Finally, with the same γ as in Example 4.3,
put
P (C) =
∫
N
PN (C) γ(dN) (C ⊂ Ω).
Hence, P is a probability on 2Ω such that P{ξn = ak} = 0 for every k and n.
Indeed, for every N ≥ k, one has
PN{ξn = ak} = P
(n)
N (S
n−1 × {ak}) =
♯((Sn−1 × {ak}) ∩ S
n
N )
Nn
=
Nn−1
Nn
and, then, P{ξn = ak} =
∫
{N≥k}N
−1 γ(dN) = 0. Moreover, for any n ≥ 2,
(6) P{ξ1 6= ξ2 6= · · · 6= ξn} = 1
Indeed, if N > n, one gets
PN ({ξ1 6= ξ2 6= · · · 6= ξn} × S
∞) = P
(n)
N {ξ1 6= ξ2 6= · · · 6= ξn}
=
N(N − 1) · · · (N − n+ 1)
Nn
and, since
P{ξ1 6= ξ2 6= · · · 6= ξn} =
∫
{N≥n}
N(N − 1) · · · (N − n+ 1)
Nn
γ(dN)
the equality in (6) follows. Now, if (pk)k≥1 is any sequence such that pk ≥ 0 for
every k and
∑
k pk = 1, there is k¯ such that pk¯ = max{p1, p2, . . .} > 0. Then,
there is a contradiction between the adoption of P as a probability on 2Ω and the
assumption that f
(n)
k :=
∑n
j=1 1{ak}(ξj)/n converges, in some sense, to pk for every
k, as n → ∞. Indeed, with respect to P , for each n it is practically sure – in view
of (6) – that there are n indices, say k1, . . . , kn, for which f
(n)
ki
= 1/n (i = 1, . . . , n).
So, one gets
(7) P
{
f
(n)
k¯
≤
pk¯
M
}
= 1
for any M,n ∈ N and n > M/pk¯, thus contradicting any reasonable definition of
convergence of f
(n)
k¯
to pk¯, as n→∞.
The above example shows that the condition of countable additivity does not
follow from the fact that
∑
k f
(n)
k = 1 holds true in any case, combined with the
assumption that frequencies approach probabilities as n increases to infinity. Indeed,
(7) and the arbitrariness of (pk)k≥1 show, once again, the inadequacy of the use
of frequencies to prove countable additivity. The sense of this statement can be
strengthened even further when PN is defined to be the Kolmogorov extension of
the P
(n)
N ’s to the smallest σ–alegbra containing all the sets ξ
−1
m (A) for all m and all
A ⊂ S. It is easy to check that the ξn’s turn out to be independent and identically
distributed, with uniform distribution on SN , with respect to any extension of the
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P
(n)
N ’s. Moreover, if PN corresponds to the Kolmogorov extension, then the strong
law of large numbers yields
PN
{
lim
n
f
(n)
k =
1
N
for k = 1, . . . , N, lim
n
f
(n)
k = 0 for k ≥ N + 1
}
= 1
and, with the same (pn)n≥1 as in Example 5.1 and for every M in N one obtains
P
{∑
k
limn→∞f
(n)
k ≤
1
M
}
≥ P
{
limn→∞f
(n)
k ≤
pk
M
for every k
}
=
∫
N
PN
{
limn→∞f
(n)
k ≤
pk
M
for every k
}
γ(dN)
= 1.
Then, with respect to this particular P , we are practically sure that frequencies
converge and that the sum of the series is in [0, ε) for every ε > 0.
Point 4. The last objection raised by F is about a seeming slip made by dF, in
the previous part of the correspondence, apropos of the nature of the weak limit
of a sequence of p.d. functions. As already recalled in this very same section, dF
found it bizarre that, in the common approach based on countable additivity, such
limit was not necessarily a p.d. function. F maintains that this phenomenon is not
warded off by the adoption of dF point of view. In support of this statement, F
gives the example of the p.d. functions Fn(x) = (1(−n,n]/2 + 1(n,∞))(x), x ∈ R
and n = 1, 2, . . .. It is easy for dF to prove that the F argument is ineffective since
the function F ≡ 1/2, limit of (Fn)n≥1, can be viewed, within the finitely additive
frame, as a p.d. function.
6. Final remarks
The paper we have annotated in the previous sections cannot be counted among
de Finetti’s most important works. Nonetheless, it represents a direct evidence of an
extremely interesting stage of his scientific career. It is the stage of the mathemati-
cal formulation of his subjectivistic conception of probability, and of the consequent
conclusion that the only general restriction on the class of the admissible proba-
bility laws is given by the coherence principle. Hence, probabilities on algebras of
events must be additive, but not necessarily countably additive. This, on the one
hand, led him to revise the value, in terms of their generality, of a few of his own
previous theorems that were proved, in part, under the assumption of continuity
of probability laws. His critique, on the other hand, did not even spare one of the
most renowned achievements of the theory of probability, i.e. the strong law of
large numbers. By resorting to enlightening examples, in Sui Passaggi he succeeds
in enhancing some crucial differences between the two viewpoints taken into con-
sideration therein. Besides, the discussion with Fre´chet gives de Finetti a chance
to provide fresh and deep explanations about his stance. They continue to be of
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great interest and useful since the arguments, still put up against the adoption of
de Finetti’s theory, do not basically differ from those used by Fre´chet.
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